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SYLLABUS
A policemanmay, underappropriate circumstances,
reasonablyinquireof a personconcerninghis suspicious
on-the-streetbehavior. The stopping andquestioningof a 
suspiciousperson doesnotviolate theFourth Amendment 
to the UnitedStatesConstitutionanddoes not constitute
anarrestinthetechnicalcriminal law sense.A required
element of aarrestisthe intentof the officer to make an 
arrest.
2. Whena detectiveof thirty-nineyearsexperience, after 
observingtwo menfor a period of tentotwelve minutes as
they alternatelyandrepeatedlyleft the corner on which the 
other wasstationed, walked several. hundredfeet and peered 
intothe windowsofeithera jewelrystoreoranadjoining 
airlineofficeand then returnedtothecornerto converse
with the other, reasonablysuspects that the menareplanning
a robbery. he may approachthesemen, identifyhimself
and inquireintotheir suspiciousstreet behavior.
3. Under the circumstances, it isnot unreasonable for a police-
man. in light of his observations of a person'sactivities 
and because of suchperson'sresponseto questioning to
frisk or "patdown" the person in order to protecthimself 
froma possibleassaultwith adangerousweapon. People vs.
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Rivera. 14 N. Y. (2d)441 (1964)and Peoplevs.Martin,
46 Cal. (2d)106 (1956) followed.
4. If the "pattingdown" of a properlydetained personreveals
a gun consealedonhisperson, the illegalpossessionof 
whichisa felonyunderSection2923.01. RevisedCode,
suchpoliceofficerthen,withoutinfringementofany
constitutionalguaranteehasadequatereasonablegrounds
to makeaarrest.
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SILBERT C. J.
a verdict o.guilty. 
John w. Terry and Richard D. Chilton, engaged in behavior, on THE
corner of East14th Street and EuclidAvenue (in(in downtown Cleveland). 
two to five timesby both men.During thisperiod. a thirdman. later 
identified as_ Carl Katz approached thecorner, spoke briefly to the 
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men and then departed. 
After ten to twelve minutes of this behavior. Terry and 
Chilton left the corner and proceeded weston Euclid Avenue several 
hundredfeet to where they againmet Katz. The three then engaged in 
a conversation. As the detectivetestified: "* * *I didn't like their 
actionson Huron Road. and I l suspected themof casinga job, a stick-up 
* * *. " Withthis beliefin mind, the detectiveapproached the three men,
identified himself and asked for theirnames. Receivingonly a mumbled 
response. the detective turnedthe defendant around, quickly "patted 
down" the outside of hisclothing, and,perceivinga hard object in the 
inner breast pocketof histopcoat, insertedhis hand and removed a fully 
loaded automatic. At this point thedetective ordered the three men into 
a store, told them to facethe wall a.nG. yelled to a. store clerk to "call 
the wagon. " He then proceededto "patdown" Chilton and upon perceiving
a hardobject inthe lefthand pocket of histopcoat, insertedhishand and
removeda fully loaded revolver. A similar "patting down" of Katz
revealed nothing. The three menwere then takento the police station.
where Terryand Chilton were chargedwith carryingconcealed weapons. 
Separate trialswere ordered and afteramotionto suppresswas denied,
the defendant Terry was convicted of a. felony under Section 2923. 01.
RevisedCode.
Inthe defendant appellant's brief, the following assignments
OFerror are made: 
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l. The Court erredin not sustainingdefendant's 
Motion to Suppressupon makingits finding that 
the arrest herein was illegal. 
2. The Court erred in refusing to apply constitutional 
guarantees prohibiting illegalsearches and seizures
and substituting therefor a doctrineof stop and frisk. 
The fourth amendment to theUnitedStatesConstitutionpro-
"The rightof the people to be secureintheir persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shallnot be violated. and no
warrantsshallissue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the 
place to be searchedand the personsOR things to be 
This amendment prohibits an arrest without "probable cause," Wong
Sun vs. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1962). andis applied against the
states throughthe fourteenth amendment. Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 U. S.
25 (1949). 
However, the ambiguousnature ofthe word "arrest"and the 
issueof the right of the police to stop a person in a public street and 
question him under circumstances that would reasonably call for in-... 
vestigationand inquiry presentcomplex legal questions in the factual
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contextof this case. Consequently, the initial question. to be resolved
isthe authority of the detective in the circumstancesshownhereto 
stop and question the defendant. The validityof the subsequent police 
actionand the determinationof whether the detectivehad adequate
"reasonablegrounds" to make thearrestwill hinge, in part. on the 
propriety of thisinitial inquiry.
Therightof tjeproperauthorities to stop and question
persons in suspiciouscircumstanceshasits rootsin earlyEnglish
practice where it was approved by thecourtsand the commonlaw 
commentators. See. 2 Hawkins, Pleasof the Crown. 122, 129(6th 
Ed. 1787); 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 89. 96-.. 97(Amer. Ed. 1847); 
Lawrence vs. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14, 128 Eng. Rep. 6 (C. P. 1810). Today, 
inseveral states, the authority of police officersto detain suspectsfor 
a reasonable time forquestioningis grantedby statue. E. g., N. Y. 
Codeof Crim. Pro. • Sec. 180.A (1965 Supp. h Gen. Laws of R.. 1. , Sec.
12-7-1 (1956); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann., Ch. 594, Sec. 2 (1955); 11 Del. 
Ann. Code, Sec. 1902 (1953); Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. 
L. Rev. 315 (1942);Mass. Gen. Laws, Ch. 41, lee. 98(1961) In 
others, the rightis recognized bycourtdecisions, E. g. o Peoplevs. 
Rivera, 14 N Y. (2d)441 (1964); Gisskevs.Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13
(1908): People vs. Martin, 46 Cal. (2d)106 (l956);  People vs. Jones,
176Cal. App. (2d), 265 (1959); Peoplevs. Fagenkrantz, 21 Ill. (2d) 
75. (1961). 
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The United StatesSupremeCourt. however. has never
squarely decided whether the police may constitutionally stop and 
questiona suspect without his consentinthe absenseof adequate grounds 
for arrest. However, the lower federal courts permit such field 
interrogations. See. Henry vs. UnitedStates. 361 U. S. 98, 106 (1959) 
(Clark, J. dissenting); Brinegar vs.U. S., 338 U. S. 160, 178 {1949) 
(Burton, J. concurring); Keiningham vs. United States, 307 F. (2d) 632 
(D. C. Cir. 1962). cert. den. 371 U. S. 948 (1963); Busby vs. United 
States, 296 F. (2d)328 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. den. 369 U. S. 876 (1962)
The casesalso indicate that an officermay stop and questioneventhough
he has insufficient grounds to make an arrest. See, Ellis vs. United 
States. 264F. (2d) 372 (D. c. Cir.), cert. den. 359 U. S. 998 (1959);
UnitedStatesvs. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 78 (S. D. N. Y. 1960), 
rev'don other grounds sub nom U. S. vs. Buffalino, 285 F. (2d) 408 
(2d Cir. 1960), citedwith approval in U. s. vs. Vita, 294 F. (2d) 524,
530 (2d Cir. 1961). 
Admittedly thereissome division of authority on the legality 
of the right to stopand question; however, the better view seems to be 
that the stopping and questioning of suspiciouspersonsis not prohibited 
by the Constitution. See. Note, 50 Cornell L. Q. 529. 533 (1965); 
UnitedStates vs. Vita. 294F. (2d) 524 (2dCir. 1961) .. cert. den. 369 
U. S. 823(1962), Of great persuasive authority do we consider the long 
line of Californiacases, decided under the rule OFPeople vs. Cahan,
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44 Cal. (2d) 434 (1955) inwhich this practicehas been upheld . E. G.
People vs. Martin, 46 Cal. (2d)106 1956);People vs. Simon, 45 Cal.
(2d) 645(1955); People vs. Jones. 176 Cal. App. (2d) (1959). Also 
of great persuasive authority is the recent New York Court of Appeals 
decision in People vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d)441 (1964)wherein this
of a person concerninghis suspiciouson-the-street behaviorin the 
An individual who acts in a suspiciousmanner invites a pre .. 
liminary inquiry by the properauthority. It does not unreasonably 
Ohio At LargeIn The Fifty States. 1962Duke L. J. 319 (1962.). Such a 
failed to reveal probable cause, it would thereby forestall invalid 
arrests of innocent persons on inadequatecauseand the attendant in-
vasion of personal liberty and reputation. if it revealed probable cause,
it would do no more than open the way to a vaiid arrest The businessof
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them from taking place whenever it islegally possible. As stated by 
the New York Courtof Appeals in the recent case of Peoplevs. Rivera. 
"Theauthority of the police to stop defendant a.n.d 
* * * Prompt inquiryinto suspiciousor unusual street 
function OF city police to be alert to things going wrong 
duty would be closed off. " 
possibility of some future infraction shouldnot require that the police
piciousbehavior. If such abuses arise. we shall deal withthem when 
the time comes. However, for the present, we hold that under the facts 
of this case. the detective's inquiry was reasonable under the conditions 
presented. 
despite a right of inquiry. the arresttook place the moment the defendant 
was questioned by the detective. Accordingto hisargument since the 
arrest took. place at the time of the initial inquiry. there was at that 
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evidence mustbe suppressed insupport of this the defendantappellant's
brief states: "Sincethe policeofficersin this casedid not conduct 
interrogate. "
Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1093, 1096 (1964); Commonwealth vs.
Supreme Court appear to have adopted thislatter usage,seeCarroll
vs. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 136(1925); Bringegarvs. UnitedStates,
f 
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involved: A purpose. to take THE-person into custody 
an actual or constructive seizure ordetention of 
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***after they left the cornerand you 
observedthemagain infront of * * * 
(the store where the three men met) 
***whatdid you do? 
"A. 1 stopped them andwentover and talked 
"Q. Then inthissituation you. considered them 
to be underarrestwhenyou orderedthe store 
people to call for the wagon?
"A. That's right. "
Thedefendant appellant, however. contends thatthe case of 
Henryvs. UnitedStates, 361 U. S. 98 (1959). establishes the point that 
the arrest in the instantcase took placethe moment the defendantwas
stopped by the detective. However, intheHenrycase, the government
conceded in the lowercourts. see 259F. (2d)725 (7th Cir. 1958), and 
adhered to the concessionbefore theSupreme Court, that the "arrest"
occurred the moment the car inwhich Henry was ridingwas stopped 
bythe federal agents. The SupremeCourtin its opinionstated:
"The prosecutionconcededbelow. and adheres to 
that concession here, that thearresttook place
when the federalagents stoppedthe car. Thisis 
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our riew of the facts of this particular case. "
361u. s. at103. 
When the opinionin Henryis read in light of thisconcession, 
it is apparentthat the court was only deciding that, in the circumstances 
of that case. therewasno probable cause to justify an "arrest"at the 
time the carinwhich Henry was riding was stopped. See, United States
vs. Bonanno,supraat p. 85;Busbyvs. UnitedStates, supra. There-
fore, we hold that. in the instant case. the actual arrestdid not occur 
untilthe defendant was orderedinto thestoreafterthe loaded gun was
discovered concealed on his person; Cf. Riosvs. United States, 364 
U. s. 253 (1960). 
Having determinedthat the police officer could validly inquire
into the activities of the defendant. then it followsthat the officer ought 
to be allowedto frisk. undersome circumstancesat least, to insure
that the suspectdoes notpossess a dangerous weapon which would put the
safety of the officer inperil. See, Remington, The Law Relating to 
"onThe Street"Detention, Questioning andFriskingofSuspected 
Persons and Police Arrest Privilegesin General, 51 J. Crim. L. .
C. & P. S. 386, 391(1960). What is theofficer to do inthissituation? 
Are we to allow him the right of inquiry and then, when thisright is 
exercised, rewardhim with an assailant'sbullet? The practice of 
friskingiswell accepted in police practice and policeofficers seem
unanimousinstatingthatfriskingisdonefor self-protectionandnot as
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a mere evidentiary fishingexpedition. See, Note, Philadelphia Police
Practice and The Law of Arrest, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182(l952); 
Leagre, TheFourth Amendment and TheLaw of Arrest, 54J. Crim.
L., c. & P. S. 393(1963). The UniformArrestActand the state
statutes which providefor questioningofsuspicious persons specifically
allow forthefrisking of a suspect. See, Warner, The UniformArrest
Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315 (1942); Gen. Laws of R. I., Sec. 12-7 -2
(1954): N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann.,Ch. 594. Sec. 3 (1955);11Del. Code 
Ann., Sec. 1903 (1953); N. Y. CodeCrim. Pro.,Sec. 180a(1965 Supp.).
Inother states theright isrecognizedby courtdecision. See, People
vs. Rivera, 14 N. Y. (2d)441 (1964); People vs.Martin 46 Cal. (2d)
106 (1956); People vs.Simon. 45 Cal. (2d)645 (1955) People vs. Jones,.
176 Cal. App. (2d) 265(1959). 
In the instantcase thisofficer, of thirty-nineyearsEXPERIENCE,
reasonably suspectedthat thedefendantwas "casing"a storewith
robbery in mind. It was alsologicalforthisEXPERIENCEDdetective to
presumethat the defendant wasarmedand dangerous Asstated in 
the record:
"Q. Detective McFadden,can you tell us whyyou
turnedJohnTerryaroundfacingthe othertwomen,
;-
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to pull a stick-upand theey may have a gun.
However, we must becareful to distinguish that thefrisk
authorized herein includes onlya friskfor a dangerousweapon. It by 
nomeans authorizes a searchfor contraband, evidentiarymaterial, or 
anythingelsein theabsence of reasonablegrounds to arrest. Such a 
search is controlled by the requirementsof thefourth amendmentand 
probable cause is essential. Whitevs. United States, 271 F. (2d) 829
(D. C. Cir. 1959). Therefore. we hold only that ONthefacts in 
the instant case,the friskfordangerousweapons was validasanincident
to a valid inquiry by the police. Eachcasemustbedecideduponits own
facts.
Asa result of the valid frisk, a fully loaded automatic was
discoveredconcealed on thepersonof the defendants.The unauthorized
possession of this weapon i" a f@l@ny i11~r .$ectiom. 2923. 01,, Rtnri.1Jed 
C~. According to the uacont~cted ~vid.e~ce bl thit11 CU®~ th@ def@i'tnd3.~ 
wu not arrested until after he was orderedintothe store. At the moment
of the arrest, thedetective had reasonablegrounds to believe a felony 
was beingcommitted. As statedin Beckvs. Ohio 379U. S. 89(1964):
"Whether an arrestisconstitutionallyvalid depends
upon whether at the momentthearrest is made the 
officershad probable causeto make it - whetherat 
that moment,the facts and circumstances within
their knowledgeof which they ha reasonablytrustworthy 
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information were sufficient to warranta prudent
man in believing the petitionershad committed or 
were committing an offense. "
Therefore, we hold that, as the detective had validly found 
the gun. he hadat the moment of the arrest adequate probablecause
to arrestthe defendant, Busbyvs. UnitedStates. supra, and that the 
arrest in no way violated the fourth amendment.
One furtherpointremainsto be discussedconcerning
defendantappellant's contention that thearrestoccurredat the time 
of the initialquestioningand thereforeunderthe eXclusionaryruleof 
Mapp vs. Ohio. 367 U. S. 643(1961), theevidencemust be suppressed.
Although we haveheldthat the arrestinthis casedid not takeplace
until the defendant was ordered into the store, we mustnote inpassing
that even if the arresttook place as appellant contends, it doesnot 
necessarily follow that this evidence mustbe suppressed.
The Mapp exclusionaryrulewas imposedupon the states not 
because of some commandinherentin the fourthamendment but rather 
becausethe Supreme Court believed thatit wasthe only way the police
could be forcedto respectthe fourth amendment. lf the police could not 
obtain a conviction usingevidence unlawfullyobtained. they wouldhave
no incentive to conduct illegal searches. ifwe keepin mindthis
raisond'etre of the exclusionaryrule, we canguardagainstconfusion 
in the attendant rulesthataredeveloped.A judicial rule rendering
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evidence produced as the resultof a frisk inadmissiblewouldfailto 
deter the police fromfriskingsuspectsbelieved to be armedaspolice
friskfor their own protection rather thanfor the purposeof looking for 
evidence. A rule of inadmissibilityinsuchcases could only resultin 
allowingthe armedcriminalto go freealthough failingto any meaningful
extent to protect individualliberty. The eXclusionaryruleof illegally
obtainedevidencecannotbe interpretedsoley to providea tidy "foX
hunting"theory of criminaljustice. The purposeof the eXclusionaryrule
IS to control policemisconductandinthisconteXT itit must be applied.
Traynor, Mapp vs.Ohio At LargeInTheFifty
319 (1962); Note,50 CornellL. Q. 529(1965).
Furthermore, even if the SupremeCourt wouldhold that 
federalofficers maynotinquireinto suspiciousstreet activitiesor frisk
inthe absence of probable cause to arrest, this doesnotnecessarily
invalidatethe applicable state rules. There isno mandate inthe 
opinionthat the states henceforth mustabide by all the interpretations
of thefederal courts. Traynor, Mapp vs. OhioAt Large In The Fifty 
States, supra, at 320. Local problemsof law enforcementarequite
different from federalproblems, andthe rangeof crimesencompassed
by the states'jurisdiction createsmorecomplicatedpatterns to be 
dealt with. Thestates arenotprecluded fromdeveloping"workable
rules"governingarrest, searches and seizuresto meetthe practical
demands of effective criminalinvestigationandlaw enforcement
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providedtheserulesdo notviolatetheconstitutionalproscriptions againstains t. 
unreasonablesearches theconcomitantcommandthatevidence
seizedisinadmissibleagainstonewhohas standingto complain.Ker
vs . California 374U. S.23(1963);Beckvs.Ohio,379U. S. 89 
(1964). Thenecessitieso.lawenforcementinlargeurbanareasrequire
the proceduresutilizedintheinstantcase.We agreewith theDistrict
ofColumbiaCourtofAppealswhentheystatedthattheycannotbelieve
thatthe"SupremeCourthasforbiddenpoliceto investigatecrime."
Trillingvs. United States 260F. (2D)677, 700. (D. c. Cir. 1958).
Forthe reasons statedherein, thejudgmentoftheCommon
PleasCourtls affirmed.
EXceptions. Order see journal
ARTL, J. ANDCORRIGAN, J..CONCUR.
